



Using financial reforms as example, we demonstrate that 
reform measures should be undertaken only when they have 
substantial net expected benefits. In most cases, financial 
reform measures entail substantial upfront fixed costs in return 
for a steady flow of benefits over a long period of time. The 
benefits tend to become larger in tandem with the volume of 
financial transactions. Because of these, it would be easier for 
wealthier countries to undertake financial reforms: They can 
afford expensive but better systems. However, poor countries 
cannot do so easily, because they lack sufficient resources. 
Consequently poor countries would better take more gradual 
and pragmatic approaches to financial reforms.
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I. Financial Reforms Are Beneficial When Carefully 
  Implemented
Many countries have repeatedly undertaken financial reform 
measures.1 Some have pursued them consistently over a long 
period of time, while others have pursued them intermittently, often 
in haste over a relatively short period of time. The so-called 
Washington Consensus emphasizing free and efficient markets has 
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played an important role here. These reform efforts have one thing 
in common: They seek to enhance the efficiency and to strengthen 
the stability, of the financial system. 
Japan is an interesting case. Undoubtedly Japan is quite 
advanced. Yet, the nation has been suffering from financial market 
distresses since the late 1980s. Most people take the ‘inefficient’ 
Japanese financial system as the culprit that has brought long run 
stagnation. Note that the problems got serious at the time when 
Japan began to actively integrate the national financial market with 
the global market. After suffering for about 20 years, Japan seems 
to have finally put the financial system in order. Perhaps it is not 
a coincidence that the Japanese economy is reviving now. See, for 
example, Bergsten, Ito, and Noland (2001).
Singapore and Hong Kong have grown rapidly with concurrent 
good development of financial markets: Both are high-income 
economies and both boast world-class financial centers. Taiwan and 
Malaysia have also grown rapidly, though their financial sector 
developments lag slightly behind those of the real sector. Note that 
in these countries financial sectors have never been tightly 
controlled. And they remained open to international players from 
early on. As a result they have been able to grow in tandem with 
the real sectors. None of them have experienced financial crises.
Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand had grown rapidly, too, 
but their financial sector developments had remained very retarded, 
mainly because they had been tightly controlled and protected. 
Then almost suddenly these countries began to open up the 
financial markets in the early 1990s. However, their retarded 
financial markets were apparently not strong enough to successfully 
compete in the new environments. Their economies failed miserably 
in 1997.2 Philippines, which had retarded financial markets as well 
as lackluster development records, failed, too, in 1997.
1
Financial reform measures refer to policies of external as well as 
internal liberalizations of financial markets, including removal of (domestic) 
financial repressions and capital account liberalization.
2
Indonesia’s financial markets were subject to considerable reform and 
liberalization in the 1980s. But the rapid liberalization, undertaken under 
conditions of weak regulation, made the financial system very vulnerable to 
sudden shocks. The centralized systems of regulation were weakened, but 
nothing much was put in place to regulate the new forms of market 
behavior.
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China is an interesting case in that the economy has been 
growing very rapidly, though financial sector developments have 
lagged far behind those of the real sector. Yet, so far she has 
avoided financial crises. Note that Chinese financial system is not 
yet fully liberalized and is under rather strong central regulatory 
system.
Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, North Korea, and Viet Nam 
have very much undeveloped economies, financial as well as real. 
Though these countries have avoided having serious financial 
crises, it does not mean much, since their economies are very poor 
in any case. Living conditions in these countries are often worse 
than those of the crisis-struck countries. 
When a country’s financial sector grows in tandem with its real 
sector, the country tends to have good economic outcomes. Though 
evolutionary forces of markets can promote financial sector 
developments, it is essential to continuously exert purposeful 
reform efforts. And provided that appropriate precautionary 
measures are taken, opening financial markets to international 
players is a good way to promote development. Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia appear to be good examples.
When one country’s financial sector developments lag far behind 
its real sector developments for too long, the country is very likely 
to experience a serious financial crisis. It would be especially so 
when hitherto regulated and protected markets are suddenly 
exposed to freer competition. South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Mexico, and Russia had problems when they had opened up 
financial markets very rapidly. Japan, Sweden, and USA had 
problems when they uplifted important elements of regulation 
without taking sufficient precautionary measures.3
How about China? China has so far avoided financial crises, 
though its real sector has been growing very rapidly in the face of 
an apparently very retarded financial sector. The fact that China 
has successfully avoided having crises in the last 25 years may 
make her somewhat too confident. However, recall that South 
Korea, for example, had been growing rapidly for over 30 years 
without experiencing serious financial crises: Yet South Korea was 
3
According to Bordo and Eichengreen (2002) during 1973-97, there were 
47 crises in developed countries and 95 in emerging markets with average 
output losses of 6.25% and 9.21% of GDPs respectively.
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totally helpless when one hit the country in 1997. And South 
Korea paid huge costs. China may be different. Still, it would be 
prudent for China to begin to undertake financial reform measures 
before it gets too late.4
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia, North Korea, Philippines, 
and Viet Nam do not yet have efficiently working financial sectors. 
When these countries begin to grow, they have to create financial 
sectors almost anew. In doing so, they should be able to learn from 
the achievements and mistakes of the early starters such as Japan, 
South Korea, and Singapore. 
As with any reform efforts financial reforms tend to produce good 
outcomes in the long run. However, they often produce dismal 
outcomes in the short run. Are there ways to avoid these pitfalls? 
That is, is it possible to make financial reforms less costly but 
more beneficial? And can financial reforms serve more directly for 
poverty alleviation? Can a financial system fit for all countries, or 
each needs a different system depending on its stage of 
development? What can international donor agencies do to help 
poor countries in their attempt to undertake financial reform 
measures? This paper is our attempt to get answers to these 
questions.
Our approach is to construct a theoretical model of economic 
development, in which financial intermediation plays an essential 
role. In our model financial reforms are understood as policy 
induced changes in financial intermediation technologies. We then 
study the outcomes of various financial reform efforts. The 
proposed model permits us to find out an optimal financial system 
for each country, too. From this exercise we get the following 
results.
First, the outcomes of financial reforms crucially depend on how 
well they are planned and implemented. When carefully planned 
and cautiously implemented, they tend to produce good outcomes. 
But when badly planned and too hastily implemented, they tend to 
produce bad outcomes. 
Second, even the richest countries should keep on upgrading 
their financial systems, if they want to remain competitive. Though 
4
China’s monetary authorities are clearly aware of these problems. See, 
for example, the home page of the People’s Bank of China at 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn.
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evolutionary forces of markets play important roles for the 
improvement of their financial systems, conscientious efforts by 
stakeholders are needed, too. 
Third, for poor countries, adopting a too advanced system could 
be a mistake: They could easily end off worse. This would be the 
case when the adopted system turns out to be too ‘expensive’ for a 
poor country. It would be much better for a poor country to have a 
system suitable for its stage of development. It is unwise for a 
country with a per capita income of less than $1,000 to go for a 
financial system suitable for a country with a per capita income of 
over $30,000.5
Fourth, assistance from international donor institutions can 
alleviate some of the dilemma that poor countries have in adopting 
financial reforms. Frequently poor countries cannot afford to 
implement desirable but costly financial reforms. Financial aid and 
technical assistance from donors can help poor countries to 
introduce ‘decent’ financial reforms. 
Fifth, there exist various financial practices that may cost little 
but have fairly large benefits. Poor countries can easily adopt them. 
Mutual savings and loan clubs, an export financing scheme, trade 
credit, micro-finance, an extended family financing, and perhaps 
the town and village enterprise financing schemes are a few such 
examples. 
Sixth, financial practices can serve for specific objectives and 
needs. For example, they can be used to help technological 
developments, to promote small-scale enterprises, and to help 
human resources accumulation. More importantly, they can be 
used as useful means for poverty alleviation. When the targets have 
external effects, characteristics of public goods, or are subject to 
market imperfections, targeted financing could be justified. 
Seventh, though countries are strongly tempted to use policy-led 
credit allocation schemes, we would advise them not to do so. 
When policies are closely aligned to market signals, such practices 
may produce desirable results. But policies are usually not closely 
aligned to market signals, and as such policy-led credit allocation 
schemes tend to produce very bad outcomes. 
The paper consists of the followings. In section II we spell out 
5 The point should not be used as an excuse for not initiating any reform 
plans.
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our key points in non-technical terms. Most of the points are based 
on the more formal approach taken in section III. There we 
construct a theoretical model of financial reforms. The model is a 
variation of the neoclassical growth model. One crucial difference is 
the inclusion in the model of financial intermediation process. In 
section IV, we attempt to shed further lights by reviewing financial 
development records of South Korea through the framework of the 
proposed model. Section V concludes the paper.
II. A Common Sense Approach to the Problems
A fundamental and universal fact of life is that there is no such 
thing as free lunch. In order to have something valuable, we must 
pay for it. Any action that brings benefits always carries costs. This 
is true for policy changes of many kinds, too. Of course it is 
equally true for financial reforms. For example, reform efforts to 
reduce costs of financial intermediation are costly, too. 
We take various actions to reform the financial sector, pre-
sumably because doing so would yield benefits. Indeed financial 
reform efforts do yield substantial benefits. They tend to enhance 
the efficiency of the system, and when thoughtfully implemented, 
they tend to strengthen the stability of the system. However, even 
here we have to remember that implementing financial reform 
measures is not costless. In fact they often carry substantial costs.  
We cannot justify an action simply because it is an attempt to 
reform something: It can be justified only when the benefits of 
doing so exceeds its costs in appropriate senses. This implies most 
of all that before we undertake any reform measure, we should 
carefully weigh its benefits and costs. A reform measure, however 
beneficial it may be, should not be undertaken, if its expected costs 
outweigh its benefits.
One important characteristic of the benefits stemming from a 
reform measure is that they are non-rival: The fact that I enjoy the 
benefits does not reduce the amount you can enjoy. In fact there is 
a strong indication that the total amount of benefits stemming from 
a reform measure tend to increase as the volume of affected 
economic activities get larger. However, the costs of a reform 
measure do not have the public good aspect. Of course, total costs 
of a reform measure increase, as the magnitude of its target gets 
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bigger. Still its average costs may fall for some range of activities. 
This fact has an important implication. In most case we should 
weigh the total benefits of a reform measure against its costs 
relative to total activities affected. This means that it would be 
much easier in general for a rich country to pull out a reform 
activity. A rich country can more easily bear the costs of a reform 
measure. On the other hand, it also means that it could be very 
difficult for a poor country to implement the same reform measure: 
It would be simply too costly for it.
Another important characteristic of a reform activity is that its 
benefits tend to accrue mostly over the very long run, but its costs 
tend to accrue mostly in the short run. Still another important 
characteristic of a reform activity is that invariably it carries a 
substantial amount of uncertainties and risks. Therefore, what we 
should weigh is in fact the expected discounted present value of 
benefits and costs. 
If capital markets were perfect, the above-mentioned two 
characteristics would not pose great difficulties for any country. 
However, capital markets are in general imperfect. This creates 
additional difficulties for poor countries. Even when the expected 
present value of benefits far outweighs the expected present value 
of costs, a poor country faced with a serious financing constraint 
cannot easily undertake a reform measure. If we interpret this 
slightly more generally, being poor does not only mean being poor 
in a material sense, but it also means being poor in ability or 
capacity. Thus here we conclude that in undertaking reform 
measures wealthy and capable agents, be they may a country, a 
firm, a household, or an individual, have advantages over poor and 
less capable agents.
Is there some ways for a poor country to overcome those 
difficulties? There seem to be two alternatives. 
One is to take more gradual and pragmatic approaches. So far 
we have lumped everything under the rubric of financial reform 
measures. However, there is a quite diverse range of activities, each 
of which has different benefits and costs characteristics. There are, 
for example, reform measures that may yield small benefits, but are 
not that costly to implement. And there are reform measures that 
yield great benefits, but are very costly. The poor countries can 
begin with less costly reform measures. These can put poor 
countries on steady development paths. And as they become 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS350
wealthier, they can move up to a more costly reform measure that 
has larger benefits. This way a poor country can eventually 
transform her into a wealthy country.
The other is to rely on outside assistance. Here the assistance 
from international aid agencies or donor countries can have a 
useful impact. The latter can assist the poor with financial aid 
and/or technical assistance. In doing so, it would be wise for them 
to begin with reform measures that are less costly, though they 
might yield small benefits. And it would be better to encourage the 
poor countries to build up their own capacities.
The idea that we must pay for what we want to have can be 
translated into ‘incurring fixed costs in return for a reduction in 
marginal costs.’ Here the present value of marginal costs reduced 
in every period stands for benefits and the present value of the 
fixed costs incurred stands for costs. Put in this way, an action 
can be justified when the present value of marginal costs reduced 
outweighs the present value of the fixed costs.
In section III we capture this idea in the cost function of 
financial intermediation. There we will consider a variety of 
financial intermediation technologies that have different cost 
characteristics. And adopting a better intermediation technology 
would be viewed as a financial reform activity. Here an inter-
mediation technology having different cost characteristics means 
that its fixed costs-marginal costs features are different from those 
of other intermediation technologies. In general a technology that 
greatly reduces marginal costs tends to have large fixed costs: That 
is, a more ‘efficient’ technology is in general costlier to adopt.
This brings us back to our early discussions. Because of the 
existence of the fixed costs, a poor country may not afford to have 
a very efficient financial technology. But for a wealthy country the 
burden of the fixed costs would not be that heavy, since average 
fixed costs would become smaller as a country gets wealthier. This 
is exactly what we argued in the above: It is easier for a wealthy 
country to undertake a financial reform measure, and the wealthier 
one country gets, the better technology it can afford. It also means 
that if a poor country tries to adopt too ‘expensive’ technology, it 
may end up poorer as a result.
The fact that there are a variety of financial technologies with 
different cost structures gives hopes for poor countries. A poor 
country should aim for adopting a technology that is not too 
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expensive, though its benefits may not be large. Once a poor 
country is on a steady growth path, it can gradually move up to 
better technologies. This will reinforce its growth capacities, and as 
it gets wealthier, it can move up to even better technologies.
There may also be some technologies that are efficient, but are 
not too costly. Of course, if there were such technologies, it would 
be likely that they would have already taken. But the real world 
does not always work so efficiently, and there may still important 
practices to be utilized. Presumably identifying such practices and 
transferring the knowledge to poor countries is what international 
aid agencies should do. In that regard, we consider a few such 
examples in what follows.
In considering some practices actually implemented, we bear in 
mind that a technology that carries a small fixed cost but entails a 
large reduction in marginal costs is ideal. Of course such a 
technology is hard to come by, and we may have to satisfy with 
lesser technologies.  
The ‘Kye,’ a traditional means of savings-loan arrangement among 
households, was widely used in South Korea in earlier periods, 
when commercial financing for households was virtually non- 
existent.6 Usually twelve households form a ‘Kye,’ eleven of which 
pay monthly dues the sum of which is given to the remaining 
member. Each member takes turns and depending on when you 
get the money, the monthly installment amount will vary 
accordingly. The practice, though of limited economy wide 
importance, did serve important functions: It filled a gap and 
through it housewives learned the significance of thriftiness. They 
also learned that mutual trust was essential for finance.
Micro-finance activities are another instances that fill the voids 
left by more organized formal financial institutions. It is widely 
practiced in many Asian countries, and it has helped many, 
especially women, to engage in some fruitful micro-enterprise 
activities. And there is growing evidence that micro-finance directly 
helps the poor. For this consult the growing list of publications and 
activities of ADBI.7
6 In fact similar arrangements were widely used in many countries. For 
example, Indonesia’s ‘Arisan’ is very similar to South Korea’s ‘Kye.’
7 See, for example, a paper by Weiss and Montgomery (2005) and 
Montgomery (2005).
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Trade credits have been extensively used as an important 
financing mean among firms. Trade credits are credits extended by 
firms to other firms, and they are based on close relationships 
among the firms built over a long period. For example, in Japan 
and South Korea the trading houses used to extend trade credits to 
their subsidiaries and suppliers.8 Large manufacturing firms also 
routinely extend trade credits to their subsidiaries, suppliers, and 
wholesale and retail houses of their products. Though used by all 
countries regardless of their level of developments, they serve 
important functions when the country’s financial industry is not yet 
well developed. The trading houses or the ‘mother’ companies do 
know much better than financial institutions about the credit 
worthiness of those whom they deal with. In that sense, they may 
be particularly important for developing countries.9
Chinese businessmen extensively use practices similar in spirit to 
trade credits. For example, in Chinese business communities in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, 
financial arrangements among ‘extended family’ members have 
served them well. Another example is the financial arrangements 
adopted by the town and village enterprises in many Chinese 
communities. 
Offering joint products has also proved in many cases fruitful. 
For example, countries routinely use postal services as financial 
institutions. It may be a good way of reducing the burden of costs: 
Space and manpower savings are immediate. The benefits from 
utilizing the postal service’s information communication facilities 
can also be great. Similarly countries routinely use co-operatives as 
financial institutions. Credit unions are other instances for relying 
on joint products. Of course, as we see in the case of Japanese 
attempt to privatize the postal services, mixing financial and 
non-financial activities together can have serious down sides, too. 
There are other practices that we would like to evaluate, too. 
Export financing schemes and directed credit allocations are two 
such examples. These we will consider in detail in section IV when 
we discuss South Korean experiences. Also another very important 
8 See Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) for Japanese experience. For South 
Korean experiences, see discussions in section IV.
9 Needless to say, superior information and monitoring power that the 
mother firms have are key elements of these arrangements. 
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and relevant issue is concerned with the wisdom of opening up a 
country’s financial market to outsiders. We will consider the issue 
in detail, too, in section IV.
Finally, we want to point out that there are financial practices 
that directly promote technological advances. For example, supporting 
R&D activities or more generally higher educational institutions 
with subsidized financing can yield substantial benefits. As these 
activities have public goods aspects, the public sector should play a 
role here. The venture capital markets play important roles, too. 
However, poor countries may not be in good positions to fruitfully 
utilize them.
III. A Theory of Financial Intermediation and Growth
A. The Basic Model
Let us consider the following model of economic growth. 
　
                            Y＝AK                               (1)
                            K＝I－δK                            (2)
                            S＝sY                                (3)
                            I＝S－C(S:φ)                         (4)
　
Equation (1) is the AK type aggregate production function 
suggested by Rebelo (1991). The level of technology or knowledge A 
is regarded as exogenous. The capital stock K stands for all sorts 
of capital, including at the least physical and human capital. It is 
well known that when the economy’s aggregate production function 
is of the AK type, persistent growth is possible. 
Equation (2) shows that capital accumulation is determined by 
investment minus depreciation and Equation (3) indicates that 
households in this economy save a fixed proportion s out of their 
income Y. These equations are common components of the Solow 
(1956) type growth models.10 Here we take the case of a constant 
savings rate for convenience of exposition. It will not alter our 
results even if we allow households to optimally choose savings 
rates. 
10 As we utilize the so-called AK production function, it can be called 
instead as the AK model.
․
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Equation (4) is a new ingredient of the model. Unlike the usual 
growth models, here the amount invested is not equal to the 
amount saved. Rather it is equal to savings minus intermediation 
cost. This is because mobilizing and allocating financial resources 
entails real resource costs. In Equation (4) C (S:φ) represents the 
cost of intermediation. Of course, if intermediation is costless, then 
C(S:φ) is zero and I＝S. Here φ indicates how efficient the financial 
system is. In this paper we treat it as parameter that policy 
makers can choose.11
We should note in passing how the total outputs are used in 
this economy. In each period, they are used for consumption, 
investment, and intermediation services. That is, the portion of 
outputs that is not consumed is used for intermediation services 
and investments. That is why in our model the amount of 
investment is smaller than the amount of savings. Of course, in 
practice the financial sector creates values, too. We can capture 
this through an investment function as, I＝G(S:φ)－C(S:φ), where 
G(S:φ) stands for the real amount of resources created by the 
financial sector with a degree of efficiency φ utilizing the ‘input’ S. 
Depending on G(S:φ) and C(S:φ), the volume of investment I can 
now be greater than the volume of household savings S.12 For 
simplicity of exposition, we just consider the case that G(S:φ)＝S 
and leave the more general cases for future research. 
　
B. The Cost of Financial Intermediation
We model the cost of financial intermediation C(S:φ) as a 
function of the volume of resources being intermediated13 S and 
the degree of efficiency in intermediation φ. We assume C(S:φ) to be 
an increasing function of S. As the volume of resources being 
intermediated increases, so does the cost. Because fixed costs are 
11
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), which in essence models the 
endogenous choice of φ, provides a microfoundation for our reduced form 
approach.
12 In national income accounting savings always equal to investment, 
because savings made by the financial sector is also included as a part of 
the total savings.
13
Of course, the volume of intermediation is several times as large as the 
amount of savings. The saved resources usually turn hands several times 
before they reach the final borrowers. Here we are pretending that the 
resources turn hand only once during the entire intermediation process.
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incurred to set up a financial system (institutions, intermediaries, 
and markets), the average cost of financial intermediation would 
first decrease and then increase in S. That is, the AC curve is 
U-shaped. So is the MC curve in general. Sometimes, however, the 
MC curve can be represented with a horizontal line, a case of 
constant marginal cost. This is the case we first study in this 
section. 
The parameter φ captures the degree of efficiency in financial 
intermediation. We assume that a higher φ represents more efficient 
intermediation. Now it would normally cost more to set up a more 
efficient intermediation system or to improve the efficiency of an 
existing system. In this respect C(S:φ) would be increasing in φ. 
However, a more efficient intermediation should imply, almost by 
definition, a substantial reduction in cost. In this sense C(S:φ) 
should be decreasing in φ. How can we reconcile this conflict? We 
resolve the conflict by making the fixed cost component (in terms 
of S) of C(S:φ) to be increasing in φ, but the marginal cost 
component (again in terms of S) of C(S:φ) to be decreasing in φ.





In terms of S the Equation (5) is a linear function with c0＋c1φ as 
intercept and c2/φ as slope. The cost function as a whole 
increasing in S. 
The intercept c0＋c1φ can be interpreted as fixed costs to set up 
and to maintain financial systems, institutions, and markets of a 
variety with a degree of efficiency φ. These costs are fixed when 
viewed as function of the volume of resources being intermediated. 
But they are increasing in the degree of intermediation efficiency φ: 
In order to ‘buy’ a financial system that is more efficient, you have 
to pay a higher price. 
The fixed costs need some clarification. In order to have a well 
functioning financial system with a degree of efficiency φ, we have 
to incur two kinds of costs: The setup costs and the maintenance 
costs. You have to pay the setup cost only once, but the 
14 Here we start with constant MC for simplicity. We will deal with the 
case of increasing MC in subsection VI.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS356
maintenance costs every year. The fixed costs here then should be 
interpreted as the sum of the amortized setup costs and the 
maintenance costs.
The slope c2/φ represents the marginal cost of intermediation. As 
we have a cost function linear in S, the marginal cost is constant 
when viewed as a function of S. However, it is a decreasing 
function of φ. That is, the marginal cost of intermediation goes 
down as the efficiency of intermediation improves. (This is what we 
usually mean by intermediation efficiency.)
When viewed as a function φ for a given S, the cost function 
given in (5) is skewed U-shaped. It falls first and then rises in φ. 
Therefore, there exists for each S a corresponding value of φ that 
minimizes intermediation costs. This means that improving the 
efficiency of financial intermediation beyond a certain level may be 
harmful to the economy. Note that the threshold level of efficiency 
is determined as a function of the volume of financial transactions 
S. 
　
C. The Growth Rates Implied by the Model




The right hand side of the Equation (6) consists of two parts. 
The first part corresponds to the expression commonly found in 
neo-classical growth models. The second part is a new element of 
our model. It represents the fact that in the presence of 
intermediation costs the amount of capital accumulation is the 
society’s savings minus not only the usual depreciation, but also 
the resources used up for financial intermediation. Evidently there 
is no free lunch. The society has to bear the costs of financial 
intermediation.
In order to make the Equation (5) comparable to the law of 
motion usually found in a neo-classical growth model, let us 
rewrite it as follows:
　
          
․
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          Savings and




0                     K*                         K
FIGURE 1




This can be graphed as Figure 1. The first part of (7) is a 
straight line passing through the origin. Its slope is sA. The second 
part is also a straight line, with an intercept of c0＋c1φ and a slope 
of (δ＋c2sA/φ). These two straight lines intersect at K*. There the 
rate of capital accumulation becomes zero. Therefore, K* is a 
stationary state. It is, however, very unstable. The economy would 
grow indefinitely whenever the actual level of capital stock is larger 
than K
*. And the economy would experience negative growth 
whenever the actual level of capital stock is smaller than K
*. In 
this sense we can call K
* a threshold level of capital stock.
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As we want to rule out negative values for K*, we assume that 
φ＞(c2sA)/(sA－δ) holds. This can be interpreted as providing a 
lower bound φ for the degree of financial efficiency given below. The 
lower bound is the minimum level of financial efficiency that an 
economy must achieve if it wants to grow.
　
　
φ＝ c2sA  (9)
sA－δ
　
Of course it is only for an expositional purpose that we have 
interpreted the above inequality as providing a lower bound for φ. 
In fact the inequality simply requires that the values of the 
parameters φ, c2, s, A, δ should be such that they should jointly 
satisfy the inequality.
The critical level of capital stock K
* is an increasing function of 
c0, c1, c2, and δ, and a decreasing function of s and A. Thus when 
the fixed cost or the marginal cost of financial intermediation 
increases, so would K*. Likewise K* would go up as the depreciation 
rate increases. When these happen, economies hitherto having 
enjoyed positive growth may well begin to experience negative 
growth. See Equation (10) below. Therefore, when either the costs 
of financial intermediation or the depreciation rates increase, some 
economies that have been growing relatively slowly would stop 
growing and a few of them may even turn into negatively growing 
ones. On the other hand, the fact that K
* is a decreasing function 
of s or A means that when the savings rate or the level of 
technology goes up, then some economies that have been 
experiencing negative growth may well start to grow positively.
Finally, K
* may increase or decrease in φ. Increasing φ would 
entail additional fixed costs, and thereby exerts negative influences 
on growth. At the same time, increasing φ would lower marginal 
costs of intermediation, and thereby exerts positive influences on 
growth. This means that for countries clustered around K* should 
be very careful in undertaking financial reform efforts. If they are 
able to improve financial efficiency without incurring large fixed 
costs, they may well enjoy positive growth. However, if they have to 
pay large fixed costs in return for small reduction in marginal 
costs, then they would suffer from financial improvements.
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D. Characteristics of the Growth Rate







)sA－δ]－ c0＋c1φ  (10)
K φ K
The growth rate has the following characteristics.
First, we see that the growth rate is an increasing function of K. 
As the economy develops, its growth rate would go up. By the 
same token, when an economy is very poor, it may well grow 
negatively. An underdeveloped economy might not be able to bear 
even the fixed costs of maintaining a financial system and thus 
experiences negative growth. For a growing economy, its long run 




Second, the critical level of capital stock beyond which an 
economy would experience positive growth is identical to the 
stationary state capital stock K
*. Thus growth rate would be 
positive when K＞K* and would be negative when K＜K*. Of course, 
when K＝K
* holds, then g(K)＝0 holds, too. These points are shown 
in Figure 2.
Third, the growth rate g(K) is increasing in s and A, and 
decreasing in c0, c1, c2, and δ. A rise in the savings rate or an 
improvement in technology would raise the growth rate of the 
overall economy. However, if financial intermediation becomes more 
costly or if capital stock depreciates more rapidly, then the growth 
rate would decrease.
Fourth, with respect to the efficiency parameter φ, growth rates 
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Growth Rate
FIGURE 2
GROWTH RATE WHEN THE MC IS CONSTANT
This shows that ∂g/∂φ could either be positive or negative. 
Therefore, improving financial efficiency does not guarantee an 
increase in the growth rate. Sometimes it may reduce growth rates. 
It is interesting to note that as the economy develops, the 
probability for financial reforms to contribute positively to economic 
growth would grow, too.  
The Equation (12) suggests a critical level of capital stock K
** 
that constitutes a borderline between ∂g/∂φ＞0 and ∂g/∂φ＜0. It is 






Thus when the actual level of capital stock K is larger than the 
critical level K**, efforts to improve financial efficiency would raise 
the growth rates of the economy. However, when K falls short of 
K
**, efforts to improve financial efficiency would decrease growth 
rates. Since the actual level of K has an one to one correspondence 
with the level of economic development, this means that under-
developed economies may well experience a retardation in growth 
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developed beyond a certain level, if it hopes to benefit from the 
financial reforms that are costly to undertake. Therefore, an 
underdeveloped economy should resist the temptation to hurriedly 
reform the financial sector. It is especially so if the country plans 
to reform the financial sector using only its own resources. 
Note that in Equation (13) the critical level of capital stock K
** is 
decreasing in the saving rate s and the level of technology A. 
Hence, as the saving rate increases and/or the level of technology 
improves, higher efficiency in financial intermediation is more likely 
to promote economic growth.
E. An Optimal Policy
Since we do not consider welfare explicitly in our model, the 
policy that maximizes the economic growth rate is the optimal 
policy. Following this interpretation, we can easily find out what 
should be the growth rate maximizing level of intermediation 











The value of φ that makes the right hand side of Equation (14) 
equal to zero is the answer that we seek. It is given by the 
following:
　
φ*＝√ c2sAK  (15)c1
　
As can be seen from Equation (15) φ* is an increasing function of 
the level of development K. What is the meaning of this? It means 
that if a country wants to maintain the maximum possible 
economic growth rate, she has to continuously improve the 
efficiency of financial intermediation in tandem with the growth of 
income levels. If a country neglects this, it would end up growing 
less rapidly than its full potential would allow.
The optimal level of intermediation efficiency φ* is an increasing 
function of c2, s, and A, and a decreasing function of c1. Therefore, 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS362
if the fixed cost of improving the efficiency of financial inter- 
mediation rises, it would be optimal to maintain a lower level of 
efficiency. On the other hand, if the marginal cost of intermediation 
rises as c2 increases, it would pay to keep c2/φ low by raising φ. 
Finally, the optimal response of φ to changes in s or A is the same 
as the optimal response to a change in K studied in the above.
F. Several Extensions of the Basic Model
There are several directions along which we can extend the 
model. Let us take a look at a few of them.
First, we can allow individuals to optimally choose the savings 
rate that we have treated as a parameter. Except for the fact that 
the resulting savings rate (hence the economic growth rate) would 
depend, in addition to the parameters we have introduced in the 
above, on preference parameters such as time discount rate and 
the elasticity of substitution, nothing new, especially about the role 
of the financial sector, comes out of this extension. Besides there 
are innumerable studies that have already gone in this direction.
Second, rather than treating it as a parameter, we can study 
how the level of technology A is determined through, for example, 
research and development activities. It is entirely possible for the 
financial activities to positively affect the rate of technological 
progress. If this happens, it would provide an important additional 
channel through which financial activities enhance the growth 
potential of an economy. We pursue this extension in this paper.
Third, we can extend the model by incorporating, in addition to 
physical capital, human capital or social capital into the model. 
Numerous studies have gone to this direction, though without 
explicitly considering the financial sector. Yet, if the accumulation 
of financial capital does favorably affect the accumulation of human 
capital or social capital, then it would be another important 
channel through which financial development can positively 
contribute toward economic growth. Clearly there is a need to 
extend the model in this direction.
Fourth, we can let the model determine the degree of efficiency φ 
of financial intermediation. In general φ would be determined as a 
result of profit maximizing behaviors on the part of the financial 
institutions. In order to extend the model along this direction, we 
have to study individual banks’ profit maximizing choices, the 
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resulting market equilibrium, and finally the implied degree of 
financial efficiency from all these. See Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) for a good example of how these aspects can be modeled.
Fifth, we can extend the model by suitably generalizing the 
intermediation cost function. This can be done relatively easily and 
the new results from this extension would offer good comparisons 
with our results. This is another extension we pursue in this 
paper.
Sixth, we can extend the model by generalizing the benefit side 
of the financial intermediation process. We have so fare confined 
ourselves to I＝S－C(S:φ), whereas in a more general setting we 
should have I＝G(S:φ)－C(S:φ), where G(S:φ) stands for the total 
resources ‘created’ by the financial sector. In general G(S:φ) is an 
increasing function of S for a given φ and it is increasing in φ for 
all S. Once we do this, it is easy to incorporate the risk factor σ 
into the benefit function, too. Then we can trace out important 
aspects of finance by carefully linking the risk parameter σ to the 
efficiency parameter φ. We leave this case as our next research 
topic.
a) A Case of Increasing Marginal Costs
(1) The Model
Let us study the following extended cost function that incor- 





K2  (16)φ φ
　
When the cost function is give by (16), the law of motion for the 






K2]  (17)φ φ
　
Figure 3, which depicts the Equation (17), shows that there exist 




 when the cost function is 
quadratic. (We assume here the coefficients are such that there 
exist two real roots.) The stationary state K1
*
 is unstable, but the 
stationary state K2
* is stable. Thus whenever the initial capital stock 
․
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FIGURE 3




GROWTH RATE WHEN THE MC IS INCREASING
is smaller than K1
*, the economy would decay to the zero income 
level. Of course, if the capital stock exceeds K1
*, then the economy 
would steadily grow to the income level associated with K2
*. 
In this case the economic growth rate is determined as follows:
0             K1
*                      K2





*                               K2
*        K
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g(K)＝[(1－
c2
)sA－δ－ c3  sAK]－ c0＋c1φ  (18) φ φ K
　
Figure 4 shows in a graph the economic growth rates implied by 
the Equation (18). It shows that economic growth rates would be 





Thus when the capital stock is either too big or to small, the 
economy would experience negative growth. It is understandable 
that a country with a very low level of capital stock might 
experience negative growth. However, it may appear strange that a 
country with a very high level of capital stock might experience 
negative growth, too. This happens because the marginal cost 
becomes prohibitively large when its marginal cost is an increasing 
function of the volume of resources being intermediated.
(2) Characteristics of the Model with Increasing Marginal Costs
The assumption of a continuously increasing marginal cost 
function implies that there is a limit to the income level that a 
country can reach through capital accumulation, while the 
assumption of a constant marginal cost function implies that there 
is no such limit. Which is more plausible? We can settle the 
question only through empirical investigations. 
When the marginal cost of intermediation is constant, the world 
would consist broadly of four groups of countries. The first group 
contains countries that are already very poor. The second group 
contains countries that are becoming poorer. The third group 
contains countries that are clustered around the stationary level K
*. 
The fourth group contains countries on their positive growth path 
who will grow indefinitely. Of course, as time flows, the world will 
be divided between a group of countries that are extremely poor 
and a group of countries that are becoming richer and richer.
When the marginal cost is increasing, the world would consist 
again of four groups in the short run. The first two are similar to 
what we have described for the case of constant marginal cost. The 
difference lies with the third and fourth groups. Now, they will 
grow only up to the higher stationary level K
*
2. In the long run the 
world will be divided again into two groups. One is a group of 
countries that remain very poor. The other is a group of countries 
that are very rich but with no further income growth.15
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(3) Implications for Growth
What are the effects of financial development on economic growth 
when the marginal cost is increasing? If we capture financial 
development by an increase in φ as before, we can get answers to 
the question by investigating the growth rate function (18). The 










We can see from the Equation (19) that an improvement in the 
efficiency of financial intermediation would contribute positively 
toward economic growth, provided that K is not too small. When K 
is very small, efforts to improve financial efficiency might decrease 
economic growth rates. This would surely happen when the fixed 
cost of intermediation is large. Finally, we can see from the 
Equation (19) that the positive effects of an increase in φ on growth 
rates g is an increasing function of K. Therefore, the richer a 
country is, the larger benefits it would get from the efforts to 
improve financial efficiency.
b) A Case When Better Finance Helps Technological Progresses
(1) The Model
Better financial services can enhance growth capacity of the 
economy when the former exerts favorable impacts on the process 
of technological progresses. A good example is the roles played by 
venture capitalists behind the rapid rise of the Silicon Valley. In 
order to capture this aspect of finance, let us now make the level 
of technology as a function of the efficiency of financial inter- 
mediation as A＝A(φ) with A‘(φ)＞0. Then the law of motion of the 






Technological progress, as we demonstrate below, can insure a country 
to grow persistently.
16
Here we revert to the constant marginal cost setup for simplicity.
․
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Note that this is identical to (7) except for the fact that now A is 





The growth rate of the economy is now given by the following:
g(K)＝[(1－
c2
 )sA(φ)－δ]－ c0＋c1φ  (22)φ K






They are again almost identical to (10) and (8) respectively except, 
of course, for the fact that now A is an increasing function of φ.
(2) Characteristics of the Model
The three key equations of the extended model are almost 
identical to those of the basic model, and therefore, no gains 
seemed to have been made by this extension. However, this 
appearance can be deceiving. 
In the basic model efficiency gains made in the financial sector 
exerted influences on grow rates through their effects on the cost 
of financial intermediation. There we saw that financial development 
would promote more rapid economic growth, when the former 
resulted in reduction in intermediation costs. It is costly to improve 
financial efficiency, but improved efficiency makes intermediation 
less costly. Thus when the reduction in intermediation costs thanks 
to more efficient intermediation is greater than the cost incurred to 
make intermediation more efficient, efforts to improve financial 
efficiency would promote more rapid growth. Otherwise, such efforts 
may well have adverse impacts on growth.
In the extended model, however, efforts to make intermediation 
more efficient are more likely to promote more rapid growth. This is 
․
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because more efficient intermediation makes the level of technology 
higher, too. This effect is in addition to the aforementioned effect 
acting through the cost reduction channel. As can be seen easily 
from (22), an increase in φ (an improvement in intermediation 
efficiency) makes the first term in the right hand side, which is the 
net marginal productivity of financial services, bigger. Though to 
improve φ is costly (this is captured by an increase in c1φ), the 
additional cost can now be more easily offset by the increase in the 
net marginal productivity.
In the extended model, therefore, underdeveloped countries can 
begin to enjoy benefits from financial sector reforms at earlier 
stages of development. This is so because its positive impacts on 
technology make financial development more conductive for growth. 
We can see the point more clearly by examining the threshold 
capital given in (23). There, because the denominator increases 
more than before with an increase in φ, it is more likely for an 
increase in φ to make K* smaller than before. As the threshold 
capital decreases, more underdeveloped countries can benefit from 
financial sector reforms.
Of course, for countries already beyond certain stages of 
development, efforts to make financial services more efficient will 
always help promote their economic growth. Moreover, the 
asymptotic rate of growth, to which all growing countries will 
eventually converge, will become unambiguously higher with an 
improvement in financial efficiency. That is, the same amount of 
efforts to make finance more efficient now makes the asymptotic 
growth rate higher than before.
Note that these growth-enhancing effects of making finance more 
efficient are the stronger, the larger their positive impacts on 
technology are.17
IV. An Understanding South Korean Financial History 
   Using the Model
In the process of the persistent rise and the precipitous fall of 
Korean economy during the last 40 years, its financial sector has 
played pivotal roles. Has it contributed toward the rise? If so, how? 
17 Of course, underdeveloped countries that lack human capital may not 
benefit from these.
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Has it also caused the fall? If so, again, how? In this section we 
seek answers to these questions. We do this by critically evaluating 
the financial policies implemented during the period in lights of the 
implications of the model we have proposed.
A. The Policy of Borrowing from Abroad
When Korea embarked on an economic development path in the 
early 1960s, it was too poor to domestically mobilize all the 
resources needed for investment. Korea filled the resource gap with 
funds borrowed from abroad. (Korea did not encourage foreign 
direct investment and its capital markets were not sufficiently 
developed for foreigners to make portfolio investment.) With the 
borrowed funds, Korea imported capital goods, raw materials and 
parts, and technologies. And to them she applied her ample supply 
of labor forces to produce export goods. The export earnings then 
were used to repay the foreign debts and to finance a slow but 
steady increase in domestic savings.
This policy can be viewed as a strategy to circumvent the 
resources constraint (4). The constraint shows that the amount of 
investment is equal to the society’s net savings minus resources 
used up in the intermediation process. As the ultimate source for 
the growth of the economy is investment, the economy can grow 
only when either its citizens save more than enough to cover the 
depreciation and the intermediation costs or the economy can keep 
depreciation and intermediation costs to a very low level. Borrowing 
from abroad allows the economy to bypass this constraint. First, it 
supplements domestic savings with foreign savings. Second, it can 
be a means to reduce the intermediation costs, if it is less costly to 
intermediate foreign savings than to intermediate domestic savings.
Let Sf be foreign savings, i.e., the amount borrowed from abroad, 
Cf be the cost of intermediating Sf. Then the resources constraint 
(4) can be rewritten as follows:
　
                    I＝S＋Sf－C(S:φ)－Cf(Sf:φf )                  (24)
　
This shows that foreign savings can contribute to economic growth 
first by supplementing domestic savings S and second through a 
possible savings in intermediation costs. The latter would result 
when the intermediation of foreign savings, i.e., the intermediation 
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by foreign financial institutions, can be done at lower costs than its 
domestic counterpart.
Now if the entire processes of mobilizing and allocating foreign 
savings are done following financial practices established in 
advanced countries, the probability of Cf lower than C could be 
non-negligible. In this instance an underdeveloped country can 
begin to grow positively by relying on intermediation services 
provided by foreign financial institutions. 
In order to understand these points better, let us go back to the 
Equation (13). The equation shows that unless the actual level of 
capital stock surpasses the critical level K
**, any effort to improve 
the financial efficiency would result in retardation of growth rates. 
Now if those countries can borrow from abroad then they can 
increase the total available capital stock from K to K＋Kf. When 
this can be done in such a way as to make K＋Kf exceed K
**, then 
even the underdeveloped countries can safely undertake financial 
reforms. 
Needless to say, borrowing from abroad is not a panacea. For 
one thing, the borrowing country must pay back what it has 
borrowed. It must, therefore, plan for a timely paying back of the 
borrowed funds out of fruits it produces utilizing the borrowed 
funds. The paying back would only be possible when investment 
made with the borrowed funds yields sufficiently high profits.  
Second, costs of intermediating the borrowed funds often turn 
out to be very high. This would be the case when those in power 
exert undue influences on the allocation processes. History is 
replete with instances where dictators and their cronies stashed the 
borrowed or aid funds away in foreign countries for their personal 
gains. When this happens, borrowing from abroad would in the end 
make the country poorer.
　
B. The Export Financing System
For about 20 years since the early 1960s Korea has used an 
allocation mechanism (of financial resources) called the export 
financing system.18 This was a system where a bank would 
automatically buy valid letters of credit (L/C) brought in by the 
exporters. Of course a bank’s buying the L/C was an act of 
18 Financing export and import businesses is now a part of ordinary 
banking activities, and they are not as important as they once were.
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granting loans. Therefore, as long as banks kept on buying L/C’s, 
financial resources automatically flew into the export sector. The 
process was pretty much automatic and impartial, and it was done 
frequently at subsidized interest rates. The export financing system 
had several features that are especially relevant for the model we 
have developed. 
First, the system incurred low intermediation costs because it 
was rather simple and easy to set up and operate the system. In 
terms of the intermediation cost function (5), this probably meant 
that the system had small c0, c1, and c2. In that case, a larger 
portion of saved resources would have been used for investments, 
thereby contributing to economic growth.
Second and more importantly, it seems to have been a very 
efficient intermediation system. Here efficiency might be gauged by 
how well the funds get allocated to the ‘right’ borrowers. For the 
case of the export financing system, funds were automatically 
channeled to the exporters. Since most exporters in these instances 
were those who had succeeded in international competition, 
channeling funds to them had the effect of channeling funds to the 
actual and potential winners in the markets. In terms of our model 
this can be interpreted as the export financing system having a 
rather large efficiency parameter φ. 
In sum, we may well interpret the export financing system as an 
intermediation mechanism that has successfully kept both the fixed 
and marginal cost of intermediation small. That is, in terms of our 
model we may regard it as a system with a small c0, c1, c2, and a 
large φ. As can be seen from Equations (8) and (10), this would 
have made the critical level of capital accumulation K
* smaller and 
the growth rate g(K) larger. This way the system might have 
contributed toward more rapid growth of the Korean economy.
C. Directed Credit Allocation Policies19
a) The Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Drive
From the mid-seventies to mid-eighties Korea had very strongly 
pursued the so-called heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI 
henceforth) drive. This was a set of policies to help setup and 
promote industries to produce steel, automobiles, ships, electronics, 
19
For a related discussion, see Lee (1998).
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machinery, arms, and petroleum-chemical products. It was pursued 
under the double catchphrases of building up the foundations for 
an advanced economy and of achieving self-sufficiency in arms 
supply. 
As the HCI drive was a policy that required a huge sum of 
resources over many years, there were virtually no private sector 
firms that could join in the efforts. That was why the government 
stepped in: It chose a handful of larger firms and encouraged them 
to enter into the designated industries with a promise to confer 
subsidized financial resources over an extended period of time. 
The firms that had joined in the HCI drive were mostly those 
who grew bigger as the main beneficiaries of the export financing 
system. A few existing and newly established state owned 
companies had also participated. These firms had become the main 
players of the HCI drive almost by default. Altogether slightly fewer 
than twenty firms had participated. Many of them eventually had 
evolved into Chaebols. (More of this later.)
Among the firms who joined the HCI drive, quite a few had 
become successful in producing world-class products by the 
mid-eighties. Examples were automobiles by Hyundai Motor, 
memory chips by Samsung Electronics, ships by Hyundai Heavy 
Industry, and steel products by POSCO. There had been, however, 
a large number of failures, too. Examples were firms who entered 
into the production of specialty steel products, machinery, arms, 
airplanes, and petroleum products. So-called success cases like 
ships, including Hyundai Heavy Industry, had become successful 
only after a long period of heavily subsidized financial supports. 
Many firms that were engaged in the so-called successful industries 
later turned into failures. Examples were automobiles by Daewoo 
and memory chips by Hyundai Electronics.
How should we view the HCI drive in lights of the model we have 
proposed here? The facts that there had been a large number of 
failures and many successful ones had become so only after a 
prolonged period of support, the HCI drive must have been a rather 
inefficient intermediation mechanism. This means, in terms of our 
model, that the HCI drive had been an intermediation mechanism 
with large c1 and c2 coupled with a small φ. If that were the case, 
then the parameter values of c1φ and c2/φ in Equation (5) must 
have been large making the overall intermediation costs very high. 
Of course, high intermediation costs would surely have had adverse 
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effects on the long run economic growth.
Note here one crucial difference between the export financing 
system and the HCI drive. Whereas the export financing system 
tended to support those firms that were successful on open 
international markets, the HCI drive tended to support those 
activities that the government believed to be important. That is, in 
the allocation of resources, the export financing system relied more 
on market signals, but the HCI drive relied more on governmental 
decision-making processes. That the HCI drive had a very high 
price tag was no coincidence. Whereas politically motivated 
discretionary allocations are highly likely to fail, market based 
allocations are highly likely to succeed. This is the sense why we 
regard, as an intermediation mechanism, the export financing 
system efficient and the HCI drive not so efficient.
b) Financial Policies That Had Favored Larger Firms
The industrial policy measures that the Korean government had 
actively pursued from the early 1960s had helped the formation of 
business conglomerates commonly known as Chaebols. Chaebols 
grew out of the general trading companies (GTC), which were setup 
in the mid-sixties under government’s encouragements. The policy 
goal was to use the GTCs as main vehicles for export promotion by 
making them engage in the business of exporting not only their 
own products, but also products made by other companies. In 
return for these services, the GTCs had enjoyed a privileged access 
to bank loans: They had become the main beneficiaries of the 
export financing system. When other firms were having a hard time 
securing loans from the banks, having easy accesses to (subsidized) 
funds was a golden opportunity for GTCs to grow rapidly. For some 
the growth was such a financial boon as to allow them to form 
business conglomerates by acquiring existing firms or establishing 
new ones.20
It was the HCI drive launched in the seventies that had 
transformed the GTCs into Chaebols. In order to undertake the 
investment projects envisioned under the HCI drive, huge sums of 
20 The general trading companies have also served many useful functions. 
For us two functions stand out: Their extensive uses of trade credits and 
their roles in information gathering and disseminations. The former had 
clearly filled huge gaps left by the banks by providing useful financial 
services for small and medium sized firms.
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money were needed over many years. Because of this, the 
companies that had grown through their GTCs were the only 
private sector partners that could join hands with the government 
in the HCI drive. The GTC related companies had quickly become 
the main players in the HCI drive and they began to receive huge 
sums of subsidized loans for many years. This continued financial 
support had provided golden opportunities for the GTC related 
companies to once more expand their business empires. The end 
result was the birth of Chaebols. The Chaebols, though they were 
mostly progenies of the industrial policies, had by mid-eighties 
become so powerful as to exert influences on policy-making 
processes. There were several reasons why they could have become 
so influential. 
First, they were engaged in so-called strategic industries such as 
steel, energy, automobiles, electronics, and shipbuilding that were 
regarded by many as the backbones of the economy. Second, they 
were employing a large number of workers. Because of these, 
punishing them for their misbehaviors had become rather difficult.
The fact that Chaebols had become too influential would not 
have had such disastrous consequences if the Korean banking 
sector had not become a de factor prisoner of the Chaebols. For 
example, timely opening up of all the markets, especially those 
where the Chaebols were the key players, to both domestic and 
international competitors would have surely lessoned the market 
power of the Chaebols. 
However, the fact that most banks had loan exposures that were 
too concentrated towards the Chaebols had grave consequences. 
Thanks chiefly to their privileged access to financial resources most 
Chaebols had become highly indebted by the end of eighties. This 
growing indebtedness of the Chaebols raised the probability of a 
banking crisis occurring should any one of them failed. As a result 
neither the financial institutions nor the government could exert 
appropriate restraints on the Chaebols. And this had become one of 
the most important root causes that eventually led to the break 
down of the Korean economy in 1997. 
How had this situation come about? It was an end result of the 
government-led development strategy adopted by the Korean 
government from the sixties. It was a strategy to promote rapid 
economic growth by channeling subsidized financial resources into 
government designated ‘growth’ areas. The beneficiaries were first 
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the exporting firms, then the GTCs, and finally the Chaebols. In 
order to channel financial resources into the ‘preferred’ borrowers, 
the government had for a long time tightly regulated the financial 
industry. Thus up until the mid-eighties most Korean banks had 
remained as mere distribution windows of financial resources 
according to government-set guidelines.
Even when the government began to phase out the policy of 
tightly controlling the financial industry, banks kept on allocating 
large chunks of financial resources to Chaebols. Why? It was 
because banks deemed the Chaebols as ‘better’ borrowers. Indeed, 
by mid-eighties most Chaebols had grown very big and were able to 
generate substantial amounts of revenues. The sheer size of their 
assets and revenue generating capacities had made most Chaebols 
relatively safe bets for the banks. 
On top of this, there existed an implicit understanding that the 
government would readily bailout a bank or a Chaebol whenever 
any of them got into troubles. This ‘perceived’ 100% insurance 
scheme had made the financial institutions negligent and the heavy 
borrowers irresponsible. There occurred a massive failure of 
governance of both the lenders and the borrowers. As a result the 
indebtedness of the corporate sector, especially that of the 
Chaebols, continued to grow and the vulnerability of the financial 
sector continued to increase in tandem with the former.
In terms of the model developed in the previous section, the 
financial policies that had favored large firms (or, the Chaebols) can 
be understood as policies that were rather inefficient.21 One way of 
understanding this in terms of our model is to view the policies as 
something that had carried high marginal cost of intermediation 
c2/φ without a compensating reduction in fixed cost c0＋c1φ. If that 
was the case, then according to our model the policy of favoring 
large firms must have reduced the growth rate (see the Equation 
(10)) and increased the critical level of capital stock K
* (see the 
Equation (8)). As we have already seen, an increase in K* could 
make hitherto positively growing countries start experiencing 
negative growth. That is, the growth rate may decline so much as 
to make the economy grow negatively. 
21
Channeling funds to Chaebols itself was not that costly. However, as 
numerous investment projects undertaken by Chaebols with borrowed funds 
went bankrupt, total intermediation cost was very large.
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D. Financial Liberalization and Opening Up
The Korean government began to introduce policy measures to 
liberalize and open up the financial markets in the mid-eighties. At 
first the process was slow and hesitant. However, once Korea 
became a member of the OECD countries, the process gathered 
speed and proceeded very quickly. 
Financial market liberalization and opening up would be 
beneficial to any country that initiates them provided that the 
country has a well established and properly working infrastructure 
for a sound financial system. When the pre-requisites are not met, 
financial liberalization and/or opening up carried out in haste can 
have detrimental effects, at least in the short run. Asymmetric 
information inherent to financial transactions, the convention of 
keeping fractional reserves, and the pro-cyclical tendency of bank 
lending behaviors all point to a need to have a properly functioning 
financial infrastructure before a full fledged liberalization and a 
100% opening up are introduced.
In terms of our model, a well planned financial liberalization and 
opening up measures can be understood as policies that lower both 
the fixed cost and the marginal cost of intermediation. That 
liberalization and opening up would lower the marginal cost of 
intermediation c2/φ by increasing the degree of efficiency φ is easy 
to envision. The fixed cost c0＋c1φ would decrease, too, if the entry 
costs to financial markets c0 can be lowered sufficiently. 
However, a premature liberalization and opening up may make 
the workings of the financial markets less efficient, at least in the 
short run. Recall that according to our model when a country’s 
wealth level is below that associated with the critical level of capital 
stock K
*, efforts to improve the efficiency of the financial sector 
could decrease the growth rate of the economy. This happens when 
efforts to open up and to liberalize the financial markets consume 
more resources than what an underdeveloped country can save for 
future.
When domestic financial intermediaries hitherto protected from 
outside competition and thus are not yet strong enough to operate 
independently are suddenly thrust to outside competitors, who are 
most likely much bigger, more knowledgeable, and powerful, it 
would be foolish for anyone to expect that all the domestic players 
can survive under the entirely new rules of the game. It would be 
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natural for the weaker ones to succumb to competitive forces 
beyond their capacity to match.22
In any market winners and losers would naturally arise when 
environment changes. For example, when a market hitherto 
protected from outside players is suddenly made fully open, some 
of the weak players in the market would most likely be wiped out 
by the new entrants. In most cases this kind of reshuffling is just 
a manifestation of how market mechanism works. The stakeholders 
of the losers would surely raise strong voices of distress in such 
cases. However, on the whole that kind of changes should be 
beneficial to the economy as a whole.
This may not be the case with financial liberalization, though. It 
is because the financial industry is a network industry that 
crucially depends on credit creation. Finance, which is vulnerable 
to large unexpected shocks, is so pervasive as to make all 
economic activities depend on it. Because of this pervasiveness and 
vulnerability, it would be disastrous to the entire economy if 
financial industry experiences a system failure. Financial market 
opening up should be done in such a way as not to hurt the 
stability of the financial system.
Needless to say, a sudden and full opening up of the financial 
markets would be more harmful when most of the domestic players 
are heavily burdened with non-performing loans. It would be far 
better first to deal with these non-performing loan problems before 
fully exposing the heavily burdened domestic players to fierce 
outside competitors. Internal liberalization of the financial industry 
implemented together with measures to strengthen the financial 
supervisory framework should be a first step. These measures 
would force the domestic players to reform themselves. It may also 
be beneficial to allow some of the outside players to come into the 
domestic markets at this stage. In the process the weakest may go 
out of business, the weaker may by bought up by others, and the 
stronger would emerge as the dominant players. When this process 
is accomplished to a reasonable degree and when the domestic 
financial industry functions rather efficiently, then it would be 
appropriate to fully open up the markets to outside players.
22
Domestic liberalization, if pursued too hastily, could be very risky, too. 
Indonesia’s experiences in the 1980s were clear indications of how things 
might go wrong with an ill-thought-of domestic liberalization.
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V. Further Discussions
The key points we have made in this paper regarding financial 
reform efforts do in fact have wider applicability. They are 
applicable to all sorts of reform activities, be they may financial 
reforms, real sector reforms, policy reforms, political reforms, or 
social reforms. And they are applicable to decisions made by 
individuals, households, firms, groups, policy makers, and political 
parties. 
The points we have made are especially applicable to so-called 
reformist zealots. They should always remember that a reform is 
justified only when it has positive net benefits. History is replete 
with incidences of bad reforms: Actions taken in the name of a 
reform have frequently made things worse. They sometimes have 
ruined the entire society. Remember that a reform is bad when it 
has large costs but small benefits. Problems arise because it is not 
too difficult for the zealots to exaggerate the net benefits. Indeed 
they rarely mention the costs associated with a reform proposal. 
What is more, they routinely use populist tactics to stir the 
masses, depicting those who oppose such measures as people’s 
enemies. 
The model we studied in this paper does not have explicit 
reformers. Presumably all the stakeholders of the financial system 
participate in the reform efforts. And most of what call reform 
efforts is nothing more than optimal responses of these 
stakeholders to changing environments. In this sense they are 
evolutionary. Economy wide reforms, however, have strong public 
good aspects, and they cannot be left entirely to markets. Here the 
roles played by reformers, usually policy makers, are crucial.
We have a dilemma: We need agents who undertake reforms, but 
they can easily become bad reformers. How to solve the dilemma is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Democracy could be an answer: A 
government fully accountable to people would take less disastrous 
actions than less than fully democratic governments. Also as Hayek 
forcefully argued, we should rely more on the evolutionary forces of 
competition even for economic reforms. Competition is funda-
mentally a discovery process that is far superior to our limited 
abilities in finding what is best. This suggests that efforts to make 
the evolutionary forces of market competition function better could 
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be a priority.
We have argued that the poor countries should take more 
gradual and pragmatic approaches to reforms. Rather than 
undertaking too ambitious reform projects that may cost too much, 
it is better for them to begin with modest plans that are less 
costly. As their economies grow, they then can move up to more 
ambitious reform measures. Is this applicable to economies in 
transition? Chinese and Russian experiences are often contrasted in 
this regard. The key issue here is how to overcome resistance of 
the existing power holders. When existing power holders turn 
themselves into reformers, as they were in China, the gradual 
approaches tend work better. But when existing power holders 
become opponents to reforms, the big bang approach may turn out 
to be an only option.
(Received 19 June 2006; Revised 17 December 2006)
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